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Balancing the orthodox and unorthodox in strategic concepts

I'm on a bit of a journey right now, the objective of which is to systematise my process for devising strategic concepts to suit all of the situations my clients find them in. To that end, I'm going to share one of the ideas in the book: that we can classify concepts using a matrix of purpose/ intent against nature of response. Like so:



Purpose (or intent) is the principal axis of this matrix because it articulates the sentiment behind the organisation’s goals
  • Defensive purpose is most common in that it represents a defence of the oligarchy in order to continue to extract increasing profits from falling utility
  • Offensive purpose is more attractive but also riskier because it represents the taking of value from other sources in the economy through acquisition or aggressive entry into other geographic markets
In both purposes one can choose to be orthodox (as stated in the above examples) or unorthodox; for example:
  • To defend by extending ubiquity and thus utility of the underlying commodity by developing novel business models and technology e.g. extending the power grid with batteries or allowing bi-directional sharing
  • To create entirely new markets on the offensive through pure R&D activities (e.g. Xerox PARC, Skunk Works, Space X)
A strategic concept is necessarily a balance and a blend of these four competing concepts. Few, if any, mature companies are able to rest with one as all organisations have a core defend and a future to prepare for. More on this to come as my thinking develops - aside from leadership, this is one of my primary lines of thought right now.

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